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The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government
Employees
Mary-Rose Papandrea
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, Andrew Shirvell was an assistant attorney general
in Michigan. This past fall, he created a blog attacking the openly
gay president of the University of Michigan student body as a
“racist” and “liar” who was promoting “a radical homosexual
agenda.”1 Initially, Michigan Attorney General Michael Cox—
Shirvell’s boss—condemned Shirvell’s anti-homosexual rantings but
resisted calls for Shirvell’s firing, citing Shirvell’s First Amendment
right to say what he wants while he is off duty.2 In a statement,
General Cox remarked: “Mr. Shirvell’s personal opinions are his and
his alone and do not reflect the views of the Michigan Department
of Attorney General. But his immaturity and lack of judgment
outside the office are clear.”3 General Cox later fired Shirvell, citing
an investigation that had revealed that Shirvell had “repeatedly
violated office policies, engaged in borderline stalking behavior and
inappropriately used state resources” to engage in his attack during
work hours.4
Not all government employers would have waited so long to
punish an employee for this sort of offensive off-duty speech. In
addition, many lower courts have ruled against government

 Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. I would like to thank the
participants attending BYU Law School’s symposium on the “Emerging Complexities of the
Government Speech Doctrine” for their thoughtful comments and suggestions on this Article
as well as Noah Hampson for invaluable research assistance. A summer research grant from the
Boston College Law School Fund helped make this project possible.
1. Laura Berman, Assistant AG Takes Leave Amid Gay-Bashing Controversy, DETROIT
NEWS, Oct. 2, 2010, available at http://www.detnews.com/article/20101001/METRO/
10010422/Assistant-AG-takes-leave-amid-gay-bashing-controversy.
2. Id.
3. Michael Winter, Michigan Law Official Fired for Harassing Gay Student Leader,
USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2010, 6:21 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
ondeadline/post/2010/11/michigan-law-official-fired-for-harassing-gay-student-leader/1.
4. Id.
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employees in similar cases.5 Although General Cox told Anderson
Cooper of CNN that the Supreme Court has held that a government
employee enjoys broad First Amendment protection for speech that
does not undermine his ability to do his job,6 the Court’s
jurisprudence is not so clear.
The Supreme Court’s most recent public-employee speech case,
Garcetti v. Ceballos, may have served only to muddy the waters by
embracing the distinction between a government employee acting as
“an employee” and one acting “as a citizen.”7 The Court had
suggested this sort of binary approach to public-employee cases
before,8 but it was not until Garcetti that the Court endorsed this
approach as a guiding principle. When an employee is acting as “an
employee,” he enjoys no First Amendment protection for his speech.
To bolster this conclusion, the Court invoked the government
5. See, e.g., Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting First
Amendment claim brought by police officer who maintained sexually explicit website that
featured himself and his wife); Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2006) (dismissing
First Amendment claim brought by police and fire officers who were terminated after they
participated in a parade float that mocked stereotypes of African-Americans); Meltzer v. Bd. of
Educ., 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting First Amendment claim brought by teacher
who was fired for his membership in NAMBLA); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143 (2d Cir.
2002) (dismissing First Amendment claim brought by member of police force who
anonymously sent racist hate mail to nonprofit organizations that had solicited him for
donations); Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that suspension of police
officer who wore racially offensive Halloween costume to party at Fraternal Order of Police
Lodge did not violate First Amendment); Easton v. Harsha, 505 F. Supp. 2d 948 (D. Kan.
2007) (rejecting First Amendment claim brought by police officer who wrote racially offensive
emails to author of newspaper column); Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112
(Mass. 2000) (rejecting First Amendment claim brought by employee who told racially
offensive joke at retirement dinner); Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 706 A.2d 706 (N.J. 1998)
(striking down First Amendment claim brought by off-duty firefighter who made racial epithet
to police officer during traffic stop).
6. Martina Steward & Ed Payne, Michigan Attorney General Defends Employee’s Right
to Blog, ANDERSON COOPER 360 (Oct. 1, 2010, 5:15 AM), http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/
2010/09/30/michigan-attorney-general-defends-employees-right-to-blog/.
7. 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 456 (1995)
(striking down federal law banning government employees from receiving compensation for
their off-duty expressive activities because the employees “seek compensation . . . in their
capacity as citizens, not public employees”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding
that courts generally should not interfere with personnel decisions “when a public employee
speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon
matters only of personal interest”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)
(noting the need to strike “a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”).
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speech doctrine, arguing that when an employee speaks pursuant to
his job duties, the government employer “has commissioned or
created” that speech and can restrict it without violating the First
Amendment.9 This reference to the government speech doctrine
raises the question of whether there are other circumstances under
which the government can control the speech of its employees in
order to protect its own ability to communicate.
Although Garcetti did not involve off-duty speech, it noted that
when an employee is not speaking as part of his job duties but
instead is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, he may
be subject to “only those speech restrictions that are necessary for
[his] employer[] to operate efficiently and effectively.”10 This
statement is a summary of the Connick/Pickering framework. Under
this framework, a public employee’s speech is not entitled to any
First Amendment protection unless it is determined, as a threshold
matter, that the speech involves a matter of public concern, and,
even if that requirement is satisfied, the speech is protected only if
the value of the speech outweighs the government employer’s
interests in restricting or punishing it. Although this is the general
framework for public-employee speech cases, it is hardly clear from
the Court’s own jurisprudence that this is the framework that
applies—or should apply—in cases involving off-duty expression,
especially when the expression is not work related.
In determining what sort of First Amendment rights government
employees should enjoy when they are off duty, the distinction
between speech “as an employee” and speech “as a citizen” is
ultimately not as useful. Employees do not stop being citizens when
they are at work; likewise, they do not stop being employees when
they are not. Furthermore, it does not help to compare off-duty
government employees to off-duty non-government employees.
Outside of the government context, private employers can discipline
their employees for their off-duty expression with impunity, absent a
state-statutory or constitutional requirement to the contrary. In that
way, employees for private employers are always employees in terms
of the precariousness of their speech rights. They enjoy the robust
speech rights of citizens only vis-à-vis the government. The problem
is that for public employees their employer is the government.

9. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22.
10. Id. at 419.
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This Article contends that the Connick/Pickering framework
should not apply in cases involving off-duty, non-work-related
government-employee speech. Connick’s threshold public-concern
inquiry is not appropriately tailored to address a government
employer’s legitimate interests in controlling the expressive activities
of its employees in such circumstances. In addition, Pickering’s
balancing test, which weighs the value of the employee’s speech
against the government-employer’s interest in restricting it, fails to
limit government control over its employee’s speech activities
sufficiently.
Instead, this Article argues that off-duty, non-work-related
speech by government employees should be entitled to presumptive
protection under the First Amendment. Recognizing that it is never
entirely possible to separate the citizen from the employee, or vice
versa, this Article asserts that a government employer can overcome
this presumption by showing that particular reasons specifically
related to the employment relationship warrant controlling employee
expression. Such reasons include a showing that the employee is
reasonably regarded as speaking for the employer and interferes with
a clearly articulated message of his government employer (an
extension of the government speech doctrine), or that the speech
indicates that the employee is unfit to perform the duties of his
position.11
11. Commentators have made a variety of suggestions for reforming the law governing
the First Amendment rights of off-duty public employees. See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From
Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J.
43 (1988); Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a
First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 168–72 (arguing that Due Process clause
might provide alternative basis for aggrieved employees disciplined for their speech made
pursuant to their job duties; noting that extending this proposed Due Process model to
disputes involving speech that is not related to employment is “tantalizing” but requires more
study); Cythnia Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First
Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (criticizing threshold public concern
inquiry and suggesting a return to Pickering); Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public
Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2005) (arguing for “full First Amendment
protection to employee speech that occurs off the job and is directed” to the public and no
First Amendment protection for speech occurring at work or that is directed to a workplace
audience); Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
121 (1996) (advocating for the abandonment of Connick’s threshold public concern inquiry in
favor of test balancing the various interests at stake); Toni Massaro, Significant Silences:
Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1987); Lawrence
Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 33, 64–65 (2008) (arguing that government employers should have broad managerial
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Part II of this Article discusses the Supreme Court’s convoluted
jurisprudence regarding the free speech rights of government
employees. Part III illustrates how the lower courts have struggled to
make sense of the Supreme Court’s decisions as applied to off-duty
speech cases, particularly the application of the threshold publicconcern requirement and the Pickering balancing test. Part IV then
argues that the off-duty, non-work-related expressive activities of
public employees should be given presumptive protection under the
First Amendment and that the government employer should be
permitted to overcome the presumption only in certain limited
circumstances.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
In the last fifty years, public employees12 have seen their free
speech rights ebb and flow. For the first half of the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court made clear that the First Amendment
placed no restraints on the ability of government employers to
discharge or otherwise discipline their employees for their expressive
activities.13 Oliver Wendell Holmes, while serving on the Supreme

authority to restrict the off-duty speech of their employees that might undermine their on-duty
effectiveness); D. Gordon Smith, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free Speech Standards for
Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 266 (1990) (arguing that any speech made outside
of the workplace that “concerns matters unrelated to workplace personnel or policies or
unrelated to political issues directly affecting the employee’s working relationships” should be
absolutely immune from government regulation). Few articles have considered the
ramifications of applying the government speech doctrine to off-duty public employees. See
Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of its Workers’
Speech to Protect its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009); Helen Norton, Government
Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 75 (2008). Professor Norton’s
excellent articles focus exclusively on the government speech issue and do not take on the
Pickering/Connick framework or discuss any other permissible justifications government
employers might give to defeat their employees’ First Amendment claims.
12. This Article uses the terms “public employee” and “government employee”
interchangeably to refer to non-civil-service employees at the federal, state, and local levels.
Civil servants are hired based on competitive examinations and are subject to special speech
restrictions and entitled to certain statutory rights that are beyond the scope of this Article.
The First Amendment does not restrict the ability of private employers to discipline their
employees for their expressive activities, although some states have constitutional provisions or
statutes that do.
13. See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (upholding state law
banning members of subversive groups from employment in the public schools, reasoning that
persons “have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms”)
overruled in part by Keyshian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Garner
v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951) (upholding loyalty oath because the inquiry
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Judicial Court of Massachusetts, summed up this view when he
famously proclaimed, “The petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.”14 Government employers enjoyed the same absolute
right private employers did to discipline their employees for their
expressive activities, absent contractual or state constitutional or
statutory protections providing to the contrary. Government
employers could limit their employees’ speech no matter where the
employees spoke or what they said.
The Supreme Court began to revise its position in the 1950s and
1960s when it held that the government could not require
employees to swear loyalty oaths and reveal the groups with which
they were associated.15 The Court recognized that public employees
were still citizens entitled to contribute to the public debate and that
their government employers were still part of the government subject
to constitutional constraints. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the
Court held that the First Amendment protects the expressive
activities of government employees as long as the government’s
interest in suppression does not outweigh the employee’s interest in
free speech.16 Since Pickering, however, the Court has cut back
dramatically on the free speech rights of public employees, especially
with its most recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.17 But rather than
eliminate public-employee speech rights entirely, the Court has
created a confusing, multi-step inquiry. This framework has left the
expressive rights of “off-duty” government employees engaging in
non-work-related expressive activities particularly unclear.

is relevant to determining an employee’s “fitness and suitability for the public service”); United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding the Hatch Act’s ban on the political
activities of federal civil-service employees).
14. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
15. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605–06 (1967) (noting that the Court has rejected
the theory that public employment can be subject to any conditions the government wants);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1963) (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183, 191–92 (1952); Am. Comm. Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390 (1950); Hannegan v.
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 155–56 (1946)) (“It is too late in the day to doubt that the
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege.”).
16. 391 U.S. 563, 563–64 (1968).
17. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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A. Pickering v. Board of Education: A Balance of Interests

In its landmark 1968 decision in Pickering v. Board of Education,
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment provides some
protection for the free speech rights of public employees.18 At issue
in the case was a school teacher’s letter to the editor criticizing the
school board’s funding-allocation decisions. The teacher had been
terminated on the grounds that his letter was “detrimental to the
efficient operation and administration of the schools of the
district.”19 In a striking departure from the Holmesian view that had
dominated for decades, the Court held that the teacher’s dismissal
violated the First Amendment.20
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall noted that because “free
and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the
electorate,” and because government employees are often “most
likely to have informed and definite opinions” on matters of public
concern, “it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”21 At the same time,
the Court recognized that the government must have some leeway
to restrict the expression of its employees in ways that would be
plainly unconstitutional with respect to the general public.22 To
reconcile these competing interests, the Court set up a balancing test
for determining whether the employee’s constitutional rights had
been violated. This test requires a “balance between the interests of
the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”23
In applying the balancing test to the case at hand, the Court
noted that the teacher’s letter involved a matter of public concern,
was directed to the general public, and did not affect the teacher’s
proper performance of his duties.24 The Court rejected the school
18. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569–70.
19. Id. at 564–65.
20. Id. at 564.
21. Id. at 571–72.
22. See id. at 568 (holding that the government’s interest in regulating the speech of its
employees “differ[s] significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the
speech of the citizenry in general”).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 571–73.
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board’s argument that employees could be disciplined based on the
inherently disruptive nature of truthful statements that are critical of
the government agency.25 Because there was no evidence that the
false statements in the letter undermined Pickering’s ability to
perform his job or interfered with the operation of the schools, the
Court also held that the statements were not sanctionable simply
because they were false.26 The Court concluded that the school
board could not punish Pickering because the school had no greater
interest in stifling his letter than it would have in stifling similar
criticism made by a member of the general public, even though the
letter was critical of his superiors, especially given that in this case
“the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially
involved in the subject matter of the public communication made by
a teacher.”27
The Court elaborated on the Pickering balancing test in two
subsequent cases. In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle, the Court made clear that the employee had the
burden to prove that he was engaged in constitutionally protected
expressive activities and that these activities were a motivating factor
in the decision to discipline.28 If the employee can meet these two
burdens, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that it
would have disciplined the employee regardless of her speech.29 In
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, the Court held
that an employee does not lose First Amendment protection for her
speech simply because she decides to speak privately rather than
publicly.30 In Givhan, a teacher had privately discussed her concerns
about discriminatory practices at her school. The Court noted that
although speech made privately does not automatically lose
constitutional protection, “additional factors” might come into play
on the employer’s side of the Pickering balance in such cases, where
the time, place, and manner of the speech may pose a threat to the
institutional efficiency of the agency.31 The Court’s decision in

25. Id. at 570.
26. Id. at 572–73.
27. Id. at 573–74.
28. 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1977)).
29. Id. at 287.
30. 439 U.S. 410, 414–16 (1979).
31. Id. at 415 n.4.
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Givhan does not seem to be based on the need to protect an
employee’s contributions to public debate, which the Court
suggested as a rationale for protecting employee speech in Pickering,
but instead on the value of requiring the government employer to
tolerate some internal dissenting speech on matters of public
concern.
B. Connick v. Myers and Rankin v. McPherson: Establishing a
Threshold “Public Concern” Requirement and Fine-Tuning the
Pickering Balancing Test
In Connick v. Myers, the Court scaled back the protections it
offered public employees in Pickering by holding that government
employers should be given “wide latitude” to restrict employee
speech that does not relate to a matter of public concern.32 The
Court held that “absent the most unusual circumstances,” federal
courts should not get involved in personnel decisions based on
speech made by “an employee upon matters only of personal
interest.”33 Although the Court recognized that speech on private
matters did not fall outside of the First Amendment, it justified its
distinction between matters of public and private concern on the
ground that it is necessary only to protect the “fundamental rights”
of government employees and not to give them immunity for
grievances that non-government employees do not enjoy.34
After Connick, a court must first determine as a threshold matter
whether the challenged expression is a matter of public concern,
before even applying the Pickering balance test. Connick limited the
protections Pickering offered because, even though Pickering itself
involved speech on a matter of public concern, that case simply
considered the high-value nature of that expression as just one factor
to consider in the balance of interests, and not as a threshold
requirement. Connick also offers courts an opportunity to avoid the
difficulties of applying the Pickering balancing test by permitting
them to throw out a significant number of claims at the outset.35
32. 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983).
33. Id. at 147.
34. Id.
35. Allred, supra note 11, at 76–77 (“[B]y affording the courts the opportunity to
decide close cases on the first prong of the test—that is, to rule as a matter of law that the
matter is not one of public concern—the harder question of proper resolution of interests may
be avoided.”).
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In Connick, a district attorney who opposed her transfer to
another section of the criminal court circulated a questionnaire to
her fellow employees asking various questions about transfer policies,
office morale, and confidence in supervisors, as well as one question
about whether they “felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”36
Evaluating the “content, form, and context” of the plaintiff’s
questionnaire to determine whether it involved a matter of public
concern, a slim majority of the Court held that only the last question
concerning pressure to work in political campaigns was entitled to
any First Amendment protection because the others simply involved
her dissatisfaction with a proposed transfer.37 The last question was a
matter of public concern, and not merely of personal interest to the
employee, because pressuring employees to work for a political
candidate “constitutes a coercion of belief in violation of
fundamental constitutional rights.”38 The Court applied the
Pickering balancing test to this last question only and concluded that
the employee’s speech, which threatened a “mini-insurrection” that
disrupted the office and undermined the close working relationships
between assistants and their supervisors,39 outweighed the
employee’s interest in her speech.40
In its application of the Pickering balancing test, the Court made
clear that “a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is
appropriate.”41 It is not necessary for an employer to “allow events
to unfold” demonstrating the destructive nature of the employee’s
speech.42 At the same time, the Court cautioned that had the
employee’s speech “more substantially” involved a matter of public
concern, an employer might have to make a stronger showing of
disruption to prevail under the Pickering balancing test;43 in this
case, the employee’s speech was intertwined and motivated not by
“pure academic interest . . . to obtain useful research” but by a
dispute she had with her supervisors over the office’s transfer

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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policy.44 In addition, the employee distributed her questionnaire at
work, which the Court found provided additional support to the
employer’s disruption claims.45
Four dissenting Justices rejected the majority’s parsing of Myers’s
questionnaire and argued that it all implicated a matter of public
concern.46 Focusing more on the actual content of the questionnaire
rather than the employee’s motivation for circulating it, Justice
Brennan, writing for the dissenters, argued that “[t]he
constitutionally protected right to speak out on governmental affairs
would be meaningless if it did not extend to statements expressing
criticism of government officials,” which in this case involved
criticizing the way the office was run.47 Brennan pointed out that
Myers’s questionnaire would be of interest to anyone wishing to
form an opinion on the ability of the elected District Attorney to run
his office.48 Brennan argued that whether an employee’s speech
involved a matter of public concern is more appropriately evaluated
by considering the amount of disruption an employer must be
required to tolerate.49 Brennan concluded that giving protection only
to speech involving matters of general interest “‘is surely in conflict
with the whole idea of the First Amendment.’”50
In Rankin v. McPherson, the Court applied the
Connick/Pickering framework to speech that was not directly related
to the employee’s workplace.51 In Rankin, a clerical employee in a
county constable’s office privately commented at work to her
boyfriend and co-worker, upon hearing about the assassination
attempt on President Reagan, “if they go for him again, I hope they
get him.”52 Unknown to her, another co-worker overheard her
comment and reported it to a supervisor.53 Both the majority and
dissenting opinions applied Connick’s public concern inquiry as a

44. Id. at 153–54.
45. Id. at 153.
46. Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 162 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
48. Id. at 163.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 164 n.4 (quoting T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
554 (1970)).
51. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
52. Id. at 381.
53. Id. at 381–82.
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threshold test for the employee’s First Amendment claims.54 The
five-Justice majority held that this comment involved a matter of
public concern because it was made in response to a major news
bulletin and in the context of a larger conversation criticizing
Reagan’s policies.55 In a footnote, the majority cited dicta in Connick
that an employee’s speech that does not involve a matter of public
concern does not fall outside the First Amendment, but that
“‘absent the most unusual circumstances’” courts should not get
involved in such cases.56
Proceeding to the Pickering balancing test, the majority
concluded that the government had failed to demonstrate that the
employee interfered with the efficient functioning of the office or
posed any danger of discrediting the office; she made the comment
in a private conversation with another employee in an area at work to
which there was no public access.57 Furthermore, the comment did
not relate to the workplace, and the Constable did not terminate her
employment out of concern that her comment indicated an unfitness
to perform her duties.58 Although the employee worked in a law
enforcement agency, the Court said that before it would accept the
government’s argument that an employee’s speech “somehow
undermines the mission of the public employer,” it is essential to
keep in mind that she was merely a clerical employee with no
confidential, policymaking, or public contact role.59
Justice Powell authored a concurring opinion in which he
expressed disbelief that the case had “assumed constitutional
dimensions and reached the Supreme Court of the United States”
even though it involved a comment that a low-level employee made
to her boyfriend, who happened to be another employee, with no
intention or expectation that anyone else would hear it.60 Although
Powell stated that the comment involved a matter of public concern,
this conclusion was not central to his analysis of the issue. Instead,
his concurrence suggested that the employer had no interest
whatsoever in restricting this sort of expression in the workplace,
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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Id. at 386.
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Id. at 389.
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regardless of whether it was a matter of public concern. Powell
concluded that “it will be an unusual case where the employer’s
legitimate interests will be so great as to justify punishing an
employee for this type of private speech that routinely takes place at
all levels of the workplace.”61 Powell saw the case as a rather simple
one where the employee “made an ill-considered—but protected—
comment during a private conversation, and [her boss] made an
instinctive, but intemperate, employment decision on the basis of
this speech.”62
While the dissenting Justices in Connick thought the majority
had applied the public concern requirement too narrowly, the four
dissenting Justices in Rankin complained that the majority in that
case had expanded the concept too broadly. They believed that the
public concern requirement was originally intended to limit the
ability of government employers to restrict public employee speech
that lies “‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’”63
Crediting the district court’s conclusion that McPherson’s statement
was not political hyperbole, the dissenters argued that her desire that
the President be assassinated was not protected political expression.64
Instead, they contended, her statement was on the border of various
unprotected categories of speech (like incitement and fighting
words) and therefore could not be considered to be anywhere near
the “heart” of the First Amendment.65
The Rankin dissenters went on to argue that, even if her
statement satisfied Connick’s public concern test, the government’s
interest in preventing such statements outweighed her First
Amendment interests in making the statement.66 They contended
that law enforcement has a strong interest in preventing any of their
employees from making violent comments like McPherson’s without
having to show actual disruption or that the statement indicates that
the employee is unsuitable to perform her duties.67 The dissenters
argued that the statement did in fact pose a risk of undermining the

61. Id.
62. Id. at 394.
63. Id. at 395 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
776 (1978)).
64. Id. at 396.
65. Id. at 397–98.
66. Id. at 399.
67. Id.
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public’s confidence in the constable’s office. Although she was a
clerical worker, she had contact with the public when she answered
the office telephone.68 Furthermore, the dissent took issue with the
majority’s suggestion that the status of an employee should play an
important role in determining the government’s interest in
restricting expression. Instead, they argued that “[n]onpolicymaking
employees . . . can hurt working relationships and undermine public
confidence in an organization every bit as much as policymaking
employees.”69 Although the dissenters appeared to give employers
great leeway to discipline any employee, regardless of status, for his
or her non-work-related comments made in private, it is worth
noting that the dissenters repeatedly emphasized that the employee
made her comment while on the job.70
C. The Court’s Off-Duty/Non-Work-Related Cases: NTEU and Roe
v. San Diego
The Court’s cases leave unclear what sort of First Amendment
protection attaches to expressive activities of off-duty public
employees. Specifically, it is unclear whether all such speech must
involve a matter of public concern to receive any First Amendment
protection at all and whether the degree to which the expression is
related to work affects the strength of any such protection.
In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union
(“NTEU”), the Court struck down a federal law banning all
government employees from receiving honoraria for individual
lectures, speeches, or articles outside of work, even when their offduty expression was not related to work in any way.71 Although the
class action was a facial challenge, evidence presented to the district
court revealed that some public employees had received
compensation for articles on Russian history and radio and television
reviews of dance performances.72 The Court purported to apply the
Connick/Pickering framework in analyzing the constitutionality of
the broad honoraria ban, but its approach to the public concern
question was quite distinct compared to its analysis of the issue in its

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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Id. at 400.
Id.
See id. at 401 (mentioning “on the job” three times).
513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995).
Id. at 461.
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prior cases. The Court concluded that government employees’
expressive activities subject to the ban fell “within the protected
category of citizen comment on matters of public concern rather
than employee comment on matters related to personal status in the
workplace.”73 To justify its categorization of the infinite subjects of
employees’ off-duty speech as matters of public concern, the Court
explained that the activities subject to the honoraria ban “were
addressed to a public audience, were made outside the workplace,
and involved content largely unrelated to their government
employment.”74 Embracing the employee/citizen dichotomy that
pervades the Court’s cases in this area, the Court added that these
expressive activities are entitled to presumptive First Amendment
protection because the employees “seek compensation for their
expressive activities in their capacity as citizens, not as Government
employees.”75 Restrictions on their ability to be paid to speak
threatened to chill their expression, thereby undermining not only
their right to speak but also the public’s right to hear what they have
to say.76
After mentioning that the speech at issue involved matters of
public concern, the Court applied the Pickering balancing test and
concluded that the government’s interests did not outweigh the
employees’ free speech interests.77 The broad sweep of the honoraria
ban posed a significant restriction on both the right of employees to
speak and on right of the public to hear what they have to say, but
the government had failed to persuade the Court that its interest in
efficiency and the appearance of impropriety justified a sweeping ban
on the receipt of compensation by the “rank and file” of federal
employees.78 Given that the ban applied to all compensation, and not
just to that received for expressive activities with a nexus to the
workplace activities, the Court held that the ban was not sufficiently
tailored to serve the government’s interests.79 The three dissenting
Justices, lead by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that the majority
failed to give sufficient deference to Congress’s “reasonable”
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id. at 468–72.
Id. at 473–77.

2131

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/21/2011 12:39 PM

2010

determination that a general ban on honoraria was appropriate to
avoid the impropriety, and the appearance of impropriety, that might
be caused by government employees’ receiving compensation for
expression outside of work.80
The procedural posture of NTEU makes it difficult to determine
with certainty what standard applies for off-duty employee speech.
NTEU did not involve the application of the ban to any expression
in particular, but instead was a broad facial challenge to the law. The
Court suggested a significantly broader definition of what constitutes
a matter of public concern, but it did so without an explicit
acknowledgement of what it was doing. Instead, the Court seemed
put off that the federal government would overreach to limit the
liberty of its employees when they were not at work.
In a more recent case, City of San Diego v. Roe,81 the Court
missed an opportunity to offer a coherent First Amendment analysis
of the protection afforded off-duty expression that does not clearly
involve a matter of public concern. In this decision, which was
decided per curiam without benefit of briefing or oral argument, the
Court upheld the dismissal of a San Diego police officer “Roe” who
created sexually explicit videos of himself stripping off a generic
police officer uniform and masturbating.82 Roe posted these videos
for sale on eBay under the code name “Code3stud@aol.com.” He
also sold clothing and police equipment, including official uniforms
of the San Diego Police Department, under the same code name.83
The officer’s supervisor discovered the videos after he came across
the official police uniforms for sale. He ran a search on eBay for
other items “Code3stud@aol.com” was selling, found listings for the
videos, and recognized Roe’s face.84 The supervisor shared this
information with the chain of command. When confronted, Roe did
not deny selling the police equipment and sexually explicit videos.85
The police claimed that Roe violated several SDPD policies,
including conduct unbecoming of an officer, immoral conduct, and
outside employment. They ordered him to stop selling sexually
explicit videos, but Roe refused and was charged with the additional
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
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Id. at 492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam).
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 78–79.
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violation of failing to following orders. Roe was dismissed from the
police force.86 There was no evidence that anyone other than Roe’s
supervisors and the other officers involved in the investigation knew
about Roe’s activities.87
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected Roe’s First
Amendment claim, but, as one commentator has noted, the Court’s
analysis was “deeply unsatisfying.”88 The Court first noted that two
tests had developed for evaluating a public employee’s free speech
claims. Under Pickering and Connick, a public employee has the
right to comment on matters of public concern related to his or her
employment subject to a balancing test of competing interests.89
Under NTEU, government employees also have a right to engage in
expressive activities “on their own time on topics unrelated to their
employment,” absent some government interest in restricting those
activities that is “‘far stronger than mere speculation.’”90 The Court
concluded that Roe’s claim could not survive either test.91
The Court first distinguished NTEU, upon which the Ninth
Circuit had relied heavily in ruling in favor of Roe.92 The Ninth
Circuit had held that Roe’s expressive activities were protected
because they did not involve an internal workplace grievance, they
occurred while he was off-duty, and they were unrelated to his
employment.93 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that although
the videos were not related to Roe’s workplace in that they did not
“comment on the workings or functioning” of his police
department, they were in fact related to his employment because he
“took deliberate steps to link his videos and other wares to his police
work.”94 The Court noted that Roe had deliberately linked his
expression to his employment by wearing a uniform, by referencing
law enforcement on his Web site, by describing himself as “in the
field of law enforcement,” and by creating a “debased parody of an
86. Id. at 79.
87. Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir.), rev’d per curiam, 543
U.S. 77 (2004).
88. Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 64.
89. Roe, 543 U.S. at 80.
90. Id. (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465
(1995)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 79.
94. Id. at 81.
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officer performing indecent acts while in the course of official
duties.”95 The Court did not indicate that Roe’s activities
undermined the police force’s confidence in his ability to perform his
professional duties, but rather that these activities “brought the
mission of the employer and the professionalism of its officers into
serious disrepute.”96
Although in NTEU the Court applied both Connick and
Pickering, the Court in Roe did not, perhaps indicating that neither
inquiry was required for speech in the off-duty/non-work-related
category. At least one commentator has suggested that the Court
must have concluded that off-duty, non-work-related expressive
activities are entitled to almost the same robust constitutional
protection that citizens at large would enjoy.97 Indeed, this view
makes some sense in light of the Court’s description of the NTEU
case as stemming from a separate “line of cases” from Pickering and
Connick.98 This may be what the Court intended to hold, but this
approach is not consistent with NTEU itself, which applied both
Connick and Pickering to off-duty, non-work-related expression. In
addition, lower courts have not interpreted Roe this way.99 It is hard
to know what the Court meant to do in this unusually poorly
reasoned opinion.
Furthermore, even if the Court did intend to hold that off-duty,
non-work-related expression enjoys almost full constitutional
protection, the Court defined “work-related” too broadly to do
most plaintiffs any good.100 The Court’s conclusion in Roe that the
expressive activities at issue were work-related rested primarily on
concerns that they were detrimental to the SDPD’s mission. Indeed,
it is worth noting that the City of San Diego had not argued in the
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship, supra note 11, at 132.
98. Roe, 543 U.S. at 80.
99. See, e.g., Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 925–29 (9th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that if the speech is work-related, then the employee must satisfy both Connick and
Pickering; if the speech is not work-related, the employee must still prevail under the Pickering
balancing test, but that Roe does not make clear whether the employee must show that his
expressive activities are matters of public concern); Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
470 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying Connick and Pickering to off-duty, non-work-related
expression; the court virtually ignored Roe and focused on the mode of analysis in NTEU);
Navab-Safavi v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 650 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55–62 (D.D.C. 2009)
(applying the same analysis as Scarbrough).
100. See Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship, supra note 11, at 133.
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lower courts that Roe’s expression was work related,101 and, the
Supreme Court’s holding to the contrary, it is not obvious how it
was. These videos certainly did not comment directly on police
activities. Although Roe’s expressive activities were not in private,
they were done in practical anonymity. He was not wearing his San
Diego police force uniform, and he did not identify himself as a
member of the San Diego police force. The only reason his
supervisors discovered that he was engaging in this behavior was by
searching for other items for sale by a person offering SDPD police
officer uniforms.
After concluding that Roe’s case fell outside of the more robust
speech protections offered under NTEU, the Court turned to the
Connick/Pickering framework.102 The Court concluded that Roe’s
expressive activities did not satisfy Connick’s threshold public
concern requirement. The Court explained that to satisfy the public
concern requirement, the expression must involve “something that is
a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general
interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of
publication.”103 The Court took this definition from two of its prior
cases involving the common law right of privacy, Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn and Time, Inc. v. Hill.104 The Court said that it was
“not a close case” under any conception of the definition of public
concern because it offered nothing of value to persons interested in
evaluating the effectiveness of SDPD’s operations.105 The Court also
said that Roe’s activities were nothing like the private expression at
issue in Rankin because Roe’s expression “was widely broadcast,
linked to his official status as a police officer, and designed to exploit
his employer’s image.”106

101. Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1112 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he
defendants have not argued that Roe’s speech is in any way related to his employment with the
San Diego Police Department or the City, nor do they argue that offering to sell a uniform
formerly used by the SDPD somehow linked Roe’s videos to the Department.”).
102. City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 81–82.
103. Id. at 83–84.
104. Id. at 83.
105. Id. at 84.
106. Id.

2135

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/21/2011 12:39 PM

2010

D. Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Invocation of the Government Speech
Doctrine
The Court’s most recent decision in this area erected yet another
barrier in the path of First Amendment protection for the speech of
government employees. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, deputy district
attorney Richard Ceballos alleged he was subjected to a series of
retaliatory actions after he wrote a memo questioning the accuracy of
an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant. Writing for the
Court, Justice Kennedy held that rather than asking initially whether
the expression at issue involved a matter of public concern, the
inquiry should be whether Ceballos was speaking “as a citizen” or
“as an employee.”107 Employees speaking as “citizens” about matters
of public concern must be subject to “only those speech restrictions
that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and
effectively.”108 Speech made by an employee acting pursuant to his
“official duties,” however, is categorically excluded from First
Amendment protection. Because there was no dispute that Ceballos
wrote the memo pursuant to his job duties, Justice Kennedy
109
concluded that the First Amendment offered him no protection.
Although the Court had referred to the concept of public
employees speaking in their capacity “as citizens” and “as
employees” in its prior cases, Garcetti was the first time that the
Court held that this categorization must take place at the start of any
First Amendment inquiry. Before Garcetti, the Court appeared to
regard any employee speech on a matter of public concern as speech
made as a citizen, even if made at work, and that such speech was
entitled to some constitutional protection. After Garcetti, if an
employee’s speech is made pursuant to his official duties, he is no
longer acting as a citizen entitled to some modicum of First
Amendment protection. Instead, that person is speaking entirely as
an employee and loses all constitutional protection for his speech.
Garcetti’s stripping of constitutional protection for any speech made
in the scope of the employee’s duties marks a significant retreat in
the free speech rights for government employees and adds yet
another obstacle to an employee’s First Amendment claim.

107. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006).
108. Id. at 419.
109. Id. at 421–25.
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In reaching this holding, the Court reiterated as it had in prior
cases that a citizen who becomes a public employee “by necessity
must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom” because
government employers must be afforded some leeway to control
their employees’ speech in order to provide services efficiently.110 In
addition, the expression of trusted public officials may “contravene
governmental policies or impair the proper performance of
governmental functions.”111 Although Kennedy, writing for the
majority, recognized the valuable contributions government
employees can make to the public debate as well as the public’s right
to receive these contributions, he concluded that the government’s
interest as employer trumped these interests.112 He contended that
whistleblower protection laws and labor codes would sufficiently
protect employees who expose unlawful and otherwise inappropriate
actions.113
Perhaps the most curious part of this opinion is that the Court
invoked the government speech doctrine to justify its holding.
Kennedy wrote that “[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a
public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any
liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It
simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created.”114 Kennedy included a
“cf” citation to Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia, which interpreted the Court’s decision in Rust v. Sullivan
as meaning that “when the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes.”115
In dissent, Justice Souter criticized the majority’s invocation of
the government speech doctrine in the context of this case.116 Souter
argued that while the government is entitled to control the speech of
employees who are hired to promote a particular message, an
assistant district attorney is not such an employee. He was not hired

110. Id. at 418, 421–25.
111. Id. at 419.
112. Id. at 419–23.
113. Id. at 425–26.
114. Id. at 421–22 (including a “cf” citation to Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
115. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
116. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 436–39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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to promote any particular message aside from “the relatively abstract
point of favoring respect for law and its evenhanded enforcement.”117
Souter conceded that the government had an interest in ensuring
that Ceballos engaged in evenhanded and lawful prosecutions, that
he not needlessly create tension within the workplace, and that he
not make inaccurate and misleading statements in the course of his
work, but the presence of these government interests do not render
everything Ceballos says in the course of his work “government
speech.”118
Justice Souter, whose dissent was joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, also challenged the majority’s decision to draw a “strange
line” between employee-speech and citizen-speech and argued that
the balancing of individual and public interests could be taken into
account through the Pickering balancing test.119 Souter suggested
that one factor that should be taken into the balance was that
employee expression have a “minimum heft” to outweigh the
government-employers’ legitimate authority to control it.120 But he
argued that often the value of government-employee speech will be
even greater when they are speaking pursuant to their official duties
because they are more likely to know what they are talking about.121
This sort of expression may also be particularly important to the
employees, who may, Souter contended, “share the poet’s
‘object . . . to unite [m]y avocation and my vocation.’”122 Souter also
took issue with the majority’s reliance on whistleblower laws to
protect reporting on wrongdoing by government actors because the
protections these laws afford vary greatly among local, state, and
federal jurisdictions.123

117. Id. at 437.
118. Id. at 438.
119. Id. at 434.
120. Id. at 434–35.
121. Id. at 430–31.
122. Id. at 432 (quoting Robert Frost, Two Tramps in Mud Time, in COLLECTED
POEMS, PROSE, & PLAYS 251, 252 (Richard Poirier & Mark Richardson eds., 1995)).
123. Id. at 439–41. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which he took a middle
road between Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Souter’s approaches. Breyer argued that in most
cases employee speech made in the course of employment is not entitled to First Amendment
protection because the government has legitimate need to control such speech. However,
Justice Breyer contended that the Pickering test should apply in cases like this where an
employee faces professional and constitutional requirements obligating him to speak. Id. at
444–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Although Garcetti involved employee expression during the
course of his work duties, the broader theory of Garcetti—that
government employees have no First Amendment rights when they
speak on behalf of their employers—has potential application in the
off-duty context, at least when the public might perceive the
employee as representing the government’s views.
III. CONFUSION IN THE LOWER COURTS
The lower courts disagree about whether and how to apply the
public concern inquiry to off-duty expressive activities as well as how
to conduct the Pickering balancing test. Given the mixed messages
the Supreme Court has sent on the public concern requirement, this
confusion is not surprising. Since Connick, many courts and
commentators have questioned the wisdom of having such a
threshold requirement.124 This test has proven particularly difficult to
apply in cases that are not directly related to the workplace. Lower
courts have also struggled to apply the Pickering balancing test to
off-duty speech and to figure how the balancing of interests should
be done. All of these unanswered questions leave the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area a huge mess.
A. Criticisms of a Public Concern Requirement
Connick has been the target of extensive scholarly criticism.
Connick’s assertion that speech on public issues is at the heart of the
First Amendment was not a new idea. The Court has frequently
embraced the importance of political debate to democratic selfgovernance in expanding the protections of the First Amendment in
a variety of contexts, from incitement to libel to commercial speech
to labor picketing to the creation of the public forum doctrine.125
124. See, e.g., Allred, supra note 11 (advocating for a rejection of Connick’s threshold
inquiry in favor of Pickering balancing in all cases); Massaro, supra note 11 (arguing for an
alternative to Connick that instead asks as a threshold matter whether the speech is
“permissible street corner discourse” before proceeding to Pickering balancing). But see R.
George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27
(1987) (embracing Connick’s threshold inquiry but suggesting that the inquiry be refined to
consider whether the speaker could have “generalized” his speech for a broader public
discussion).
125. For a more extensive discussion of how the Court has reshaped First Amendment to
protect speech on public issues, see Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern, supra note
11, at 13–20; Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First
Amendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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Connick is unusual, however, because it is rare for the Court to
embrace the inverse principle that speech that does not involve a
matter of public concern falls outside of the First Amendment. The
Court used a public concern inquiry to strip First Amendment
protection from speech, rather than to extend protection to it.
The adoption of a public concern test in the context of
government employees was the first time a majority of the Court
explicitly stratified speech related to public and private matters.126
This approach is inconsistent with the Court’s statements in other
cases that its decisions “have never suggested that expression about
philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters—
to take a non-exhaustive list of labels—is not entitled to full First
Amendment protection.”127 In Connick, the Court focused
exclusively on only one instrumental theory of the First
Amendment—the promotion of political debate—and failed to
consider the other values the freedom of speech serves.
NTEU and Roe fail to answer conclusively whether courts must
make a public concern inquiry in every government employee First
Amendment case and if so, what that inquiry looks like. In NTEU,
the Court analyzed the honoraria ban only as applied to matters of
public concern. Furthermore, in holding that lectures on Russian
history and radio and television reviews of dance performances
constituted matters of public concern, the Court applied a rather
broad conception of matters of public concern, at least as compared
to the approach the Court took in Connick and Rankin. Indeed, the
Court did not seem to care about the actual content of the
employees’ speech but instead appeared particularly concerned that
the honoraria ban applied to speech that did not take place at work
128
and had no connection to work.
In Roe, the Court performed two alternative analyses, only one
of which involved the public concern inquiry. Had the Court
believed that public concern was a threshold requirement in all cases,
there would have been no need for the Court to continue on to

126. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Estlund, Speech on Matters of
Public Concern, supra note 11, at 20–23.
127. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
128. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995) (noting
that the employees’ expressive activities “were addressed to a public audience, were made
outside the workplace, and involved content largely unrelated to their government
employment”).
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examine the SDPD’s interest in restricting the randy officer’s
expression once it concluded it was not a matter of public concern.
The Court made things even more confusing when it applied the
public concern standard to Roe’s pornographic activities on eBay.
Rather than stopping after noting that Roe’s activities “did nothing
to inform the public about any aspect of the SDPD’s functioning or
operation,” the Court went on to remark that Roe’s expression “was
widely broadcast, linked to his official status as a police officer, and
designed to exploit his employer’s image,” and that it also “was
detrimental to the mission and functions of the employer.”129 The
only one of these factors that has traditionally been considered part
of a public concern inquiry is whether the speech was made privately
or to the general public, and the Court’s prior cases have indicated
that speech directed to the general public is more likely to be labeled
speech as a matter of public concern.130 That his expression
“exploited his employer’s image” and undermined the “mission and
functions” of the police seem to have nothing at all to do with the
public concern inquiry; instead, they are the sort of factors a court
might take into account when conducting the Pickering balancing
test.
The narrow view of public concern that the Court embraced
in Connick and Roe was not only inconsistent with its approach in
Rankin and NTEU, but it was also inconsistent with the Court’s
approach to this same inquiry in privacy and defamation contexts.
The Court’s privacy cases have taken a much broader approach to
the public concern question.131 Most notably, in Time, Inc. v. Hill,
the Court invoked a public concern requirement to strike down a
false light claim based on a fictionalized depiction of a family who
suffered a home invasion.132 The Court explained that “[t]he
guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political
expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to

129. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004).
130. The officer’s extracurricular activities were directed to the public on an eBay site,
and although we do not know the numbers of people who were interested in his particular
pornographic offerings, we do know that pornography in the United States is extremely (if not
secretly) popular.
131. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 165 n.5 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing that the majority’s approach to the public concern inquiry in Connick was
inconsistent with the Court’s evaluation of the same issue in its privacy cases).
132. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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healthy government.”133 Instead, the “‘[f]reedom of discussion, if it
would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all
issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
period.’”134 Furthermore, although the magazine article at issue in
Hill functioned more to entertain than to inform, the Court
concluded that “‘[t]he line between the informing and the
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of . . . [freedom of the
press].’”135 It is difficult to square the conclusion that a fictionalized,
entertaining article about a house invasion is a matter of public
concern while an employee’s criticisms of her government employer
are (usually) not. Instead, these cases can make sense only if the
government’s interest in restricting its employee’s speech is taken
into account in making the public concern determination, but this is
not what the Court professes to be doing.
Subsequent cases in the employment context indicate that the
Court continues to be deeply divided on how to interpret and apply
Connick’s public concern requirement. In Rankin, for example, only
a slim majority concluded that the employee’s remark about the
assassination attempt on President Reagan was a matter of public
concern; the four dissenting Justices concluded that it was not
because this sort of hyperbolic comment was too close to the
margins of unprotected expression.136 For the majority, it was
sufficient that the underlying subject matter of her comment
involved a matter of public concern, even if the specific comment did
not contribute much of value to the public discussion of that issue
and was not directed to the public.137 In Gavhin, the Court held that
private communications—in that case, allegations of discriminatory
conduct—can be matters of public concern because it is the content
of those communications that matter, not the audience. In NTEU,
the Court offered yet another approach to the public concern
question. This approach focuses the inquiry on the location, time,

133. Id. at 388.
134. Id. (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
135. Id. (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
136. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378; id.
at 395–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386–87.
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and audience of the speech rather than its precise content. The
Court held that speech that is addressed to a public audience, made
outside of the workplace, and involves content “largely unrelated to
their Government employment” is speech on a matter of public
concern.138 This is a significantly more expansive definition of
matters of public concern than the Court offered in Connick.
For most people, their personal experiences—work-related or
not—affect their views on political and social issues, and stories they
hear about others’ personal experiences can have a similar effect.
(This no doubt accounts for the common political strategy of finding
“real people” to tell their story to the American public in order to
generate support for a particular measure or candidate.) Connick’s
limited view of what constitutes a matter of public concern
inappropriately discounts these personal experiences.139 In contrast,
the Court determined that the off-hand comment at issue in Rankin
was a matter of public concern simply because it related to a political
figure, even though it likely would add much less to the public
debate than the personnel grievance deemed outside the public
debate in Connick. This is not to say that the Court reached the
wrong result in Rankin, but simply that its reasoning was less than
satisfying.
In Roe, the Court further muddied the waters on what exactly is
meant by a matter of public concern, particularly when applied to
off-duty expressive activities. The Court concluded that “under any
view of the public concern test,” the officer’s activities failed it.140
There, the Court said that a matter of public concern is one that “is
a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general
interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of
publication.”141 This is a very narrow view of what constitutes a
matter of public concern. Indeed, the Court noted that even the
dissenters in Connick would have applied a test that considered
whether the speech would help persons interested in developing
“‘informed opinions about the manner in which . . . an elected
official charged with managing a vital governmental agency,

138.
139.
140.
141.

United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995).
See Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern, supra note 11, at 37–38.
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004).
Id. at 83–84.
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discharges his responsibilities,’” without a requirement that the
expression contribute to a public debate that is already ongoing.142
This dispute highlights another aspect of a public concern
inquiry that is uncertain: whether it is a normative (what should be a
matter of public concern) or descriptive one (what is a matter of
public concern).143 The latter approach threatens to greatly
undermine public employee speech when the employees have inside
information that should be a matter of public concern. However, it is
often the case that before they speak there is not an ongoing public
discussion to which the public employee is contributing. This is
frequently the case when government employees serve as
whistleblowers. In addition, a test that considers the actual
“popularity” of a particular subject may result in the overprotection
of speech that is not particularly valuable—such as most celebrity
gossip—and penalizes less popular speech, even if it does involve a
meaningful topic.
In determining whether speech involves a matter of public
concern, it is unclear how large this audience must be to be “public”
and how we figure out whether the speech at issue is of sufficient
“concern” to them. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders
Inc., the Court concluded that a credit report indicating that a
company was bankrupt was not a matter of public concern in part
because only five business subscribers received it.144 As Justice
Brennan argued in his dissent, however, the very same content
clearly would have been a matter of public concern had it appeared
in a newspaper or magazine; the fact that the credit report had a
limited circulation and was published by a non-media entity for
commercial gain should not change the analysis. After all, “[f]ew
published statements are of universal interest, and few publications
are distributed without charge.”145 In the digital age, the public
concern inquiry has become even more difficult as infinite numbers
of communities exist. What is a matter of great concern to one may
142. See id. at 84 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 163 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 670, 672
(1990).
144. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 763 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that credit report was not matter of public concern); id.
at 765 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (same).
145. Id. at 783 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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be of no concern to another. Much of the content that does attract a
broad swath of the public is merely entertaining (think YouTube
videos that go viral). The size of the audience is not necessarily a
useful measurement of what constitutes a matter of public concern.
Because there is no precise definition of what constitutes a
matter of public concern and what does not, the threshold public
concern requirement makes it hard for both public employees and
their employers to know what speech is constitutionally protected.
This vague standard can result in the chilling of otherwise protected
speech. It also can lead to inconsistent rulings. Employees with
lawyers who can spin their private expressive activities as part of a
larger political debate will be able to pass the Connick threshold,
while those who are not skilled at creating that sort of narrative will
find their claims dead on arrival.146
B. Disagreement Among the Lower Courts
The doctrinal confusion surrounding the public concern inquiry
outlined above has played itself out in the lower courts, which have
struggled to determine whether it is necessary to apply the public
concern test in all cases involving off-duty expression, and if so, what
the alternative approach to such cases should be.147 Although many
courts routinely apply the public concern test in all their government
employee cases,148 others have recognized that applying the test does
not always make sense. To deal with this problem, some courts faced
146. Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the First
Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 555–56
(1998).
147. Of course in many cases it is not difficult to conclude that an employee’s off-duty
speech activities involve a matter of public concern. For example, in one recent decision, a
federal district court concluded that it was “beyond dispute” that a federal employee’s music
video criticizing United States involvement in Iraq involved a matter of public concern. See
Navab-Safavi v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 650 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55 (D.D.C. 2009).
148. See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 256 (6th Cir.
2006) (applying public concern inquiry in case involving former superintendent’s offer to
speak at a convention sponsored by a church with a predominantly gay congregation); Tindle
v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 970–71 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying a threshold public concern test to
a case involving an officer who wore a racially offensive costume to a Halloween party widely
attended by other members of the force); Karins v. City of Atl. City, 706 A.2d 706, 715–16
(N.J. 1998) (holding that a racial epithet uttered by an off-duty firefighter during a police stop
“was not remotely related to any matter of public concern”); Hawkins v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety
& Corr. Servs., 602 A.2d 712, 717–18 (1992) (holding that off-duty prison guard’s antiSemetic outburst directed to a bank teller was not entitled to any First Amendment protection
because it did not implicate a matter of public concern).
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with cases that involve off-duty speech have refused to apply a public
concern test,149 others have embraced a broad conception of public
concern,150 and many have simply chosen to dodge this difficult issue
altogether by concluding that the plaintiffs would lose anyway even if
they could satisfy this inquiry.151 In addition, courts have struggled
to determine whether the Pickering balancing test should apply to
off-duty speech and how to apply Roe’s “work-related” inquiry.
1. Confusion with the public concern inquiry
The conceptual difficulties of applying the public concern test, as
framed in Connick, to non-work-related, off-duty speech has lead
some courts to hold that this threshold inquiry does not apply at all
in such cases.152 The leading case to take this approach is Flanagan v.
Munger from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.153
Flanagan involved a small group of high-ranking police officers who
operated a video rental store. Sexually explicit adult films comprised
less than four percent of the store’s inventory. Store policy permitted
only adults over twenty-one to rent these films, and none of the films
was obscene under federal, state, or local law or in any other way
contained unlawful content.154 The police chief learned that the store
contained some pornographic films and conducted an investigation;
the officers were not reprimanded but complied with the chief’s
suggestion that they remove the pornographic inventory from the
149. See, e.g., Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1994); Flanagan v.
Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989).
150. See, e.g., Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1985).
151. These courts tend to hold that it is not necessary to determine whether the speech
involved a matter of public concern because even if it did, the government would prevail under
the Pickering balancing test. See, e.g., Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 927–29 (9th
Cir. 2008) (holding it was not necessary to determine whether officer’s sexually explicit videos
involved matter of public concern because the City of Chandler would prevail under Pickering
regardless); Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 175 (2d Cir. 2006) (assuming without
deciding that a racially offensive public float related to a matter of public concern); Melzer v.
Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196 (2d Cir. 2003) (assuming without deciding that teacher’s
membership in NAMBLA and advocacy for change in laws regarding sexual relationships with
minors satisfied public concern requirement); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir.
2002) (assuming without deciding that racist materials constituted speech on a matter of
public concern).
152. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1564 (“[T]he Connick public concern test is intended to
weed out speech by an employee speaking as an employee upon matters of only personal
interest.”); Pereira v. Commonwealth, 733 N.E.2d 112, 120–21 (Mass. 2000).
153. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1562–63.
154. Id. at 1560 & n.2.
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store. After the local press ran some stories about the investigation,
the chief reprimanded the officers, and the officers filed suit claiming
that their First Amendment rights had been violated.155
In reviewing the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment to the defendants, the Tenth Circuit said that in a public
employee case, it would normally ask first whether the expression
involved a matter of public concern.156 The court noted that the case
before it differed significantly from the typical Pickering/Connick
fact pattern because it did not involve speech about work. Although
the Court applied the public concern test to speech that was
unrelated to work in Rankin, in that case the challenged comment
was made at the workplace.157 The court held that the public concern
test does not apply in cases involving nonverbal expression that is
neither at work nor about work.158 Driving the court’s conclusion
was the difficulty of applying the test in this particular case, which
involved the ownership of a video store. The court noted that it was
hard to say what, if anything, the officers were saying by offering
pornographic videos for rent.159 Even if it were possible to conclude
that the officers were making a statement about the desirability of
such films, the court held that it would be hard to imagine how this
implicit statement could contribute to the public debate on that
issue.160 Given the difficulties of determining whether the police
officers’ activity involved a matter of public concern, the court
decided instead to adopt a threshold test that asks merely whether
the expressive activity at issue constituted “protected expression.”161
The Seventh Circuit has taken a similar approach. In Eberhardt v.
O’Malley, an assistant state’s attorney wrote “a fictional novel
involving fictitious prosecutors and other persons in the criminal
justice system.”162 The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim because, in the court’s view, it did not involve a
matter of public concern by failing to inform the public about
possible wrongdoing in the State’s Attorney’s Office or any other

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 1560–61.
Id. at 1562.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1563.
Id.
Id. at 1564.
Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1024 (7th Cir. 1994).
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matter of public concern.163 The Seventh Circuit reversed.164 Judge
Posner, writing for the panel, criticized the lower court’s decision in
two different ways. Posner first suggested that the lower court
applied the public concern test too narrowly because a fictional novel
could in fact meaningfully contribute to the public debate by
offering insights into the workings of the criminal justice system. He
noted a long history of “sociological and muckraking novels,” many
of which were written by employees on the inside.165
More fundamentally, Judge Posner criticized the district court
for failing to recognize that “[t]he First Amendment protects
entertainment as well as treatises on politics and public
administration.”166 As a result, the government employer could not
discipline the employee for his novel unless it had a reason.167 Posner
argued that in Connick the Court simply intended “‘to distinguish
grievances of an entirely personal character from statements of
broader interest concerning one’s job, rather than to fix the
boundaries of the First Amendment.’”168 Posner proposed taking the
value of the speech at issue into account in the Pickering balancing
process, where “[t]he less serious, portentous, political, significant
the genre of expression, the less imposing the justification that the
government must put forth in order to be permitted to suppress the
expression.”169 The public concern test, Posner argued, is really just
shorthand for distinguishing between speech that is socially valuable
and speech that is not.170 Judge Posner did not consider NTEU’s
approach to the public concern inquiry because the Court had not
yet decided that case.
Some courts have found it particularly difficult to apply
Connick’s public concern test in cases involving the right of
association.171 As the Second Circuit has noted, applying the test in

163. Id. at 1025.
164. Id. at 1029.
165. Id. at 1026.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1027.
171. See, e.g., Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987)
(holding that Connick does not apply to right of association claims). But see Hudson v. Craven,
403 F.3d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Connick in case involving participation in a
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association cases is “awkward” given the Court’s instructions to
consider the content, context, and form of the expression at issue
when conducting a public concern inquiry because associations “may
deliver many different statements at many different times and places
and under many different circumstances.”172
Other courts that have recognized the theoretical and practical
difficulties of applying Connick’s public concern test in off-duty cases
have chosen to embrace a broad conception of what the public
concern standard requires rather than to discard the test entirely. In
Berger v. Battaglia, for example, the Fourth Circuit applied the
public concern test in a case involving a police officer’s popular offduty public music performances at nightclubs and other venues,
including his impersonation of the late singer Al Jolson in
blackface.173 The court concluded that these performances
“constituted speech upon a matter of obvious public interest” to the
large numbers of persons who paid to hear him perform.174 The
court concluded that the fact that his speech was merely
entertainment “presumably neutral as to any political or even social
views” did not remove it from this category.175
More recently, the Sixth Circuit applied the public concern test
in a case where a superintendent candidate alleged he was not
selected for the position due to the city’s reaction to an (inaccurate)
newspaper article reporting that he had accepted an invitation to
speak at a convention sponsored by a church with a predominantly
gay congregation.176 Because the superintendent had not in fact
accepted the invitation, it would have been impossible for the circuit
court to consider the actual content of that speech to determine
whether it involved a matter of public concern. The court dodged
that problem by focusing on NTEU’s broader approach to the public
concern inquiry. Because the speech would not have occurred during
work hours or at the workplace, would have been presented to a
WTO protest activity, a hybrid speech/association claim, because it was easy to conclude the
expressive activities at issue involved a matter of public concern).
172. Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196 (2d Cir. 2003). Although the Second
Circuit has recently applied the public concern test in an association case, Piscottano v.
Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 274 (2d Cir. 2007), an earlier panel decision suggested that it would
be inappropriate to do so. Melzer, 336 F.3d at 196.
173. See Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 993, 997–99 (4th Cir. 1985).
174. Id. at 999.
175. Id.
176. Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 253–54 (6th Cir. 2006).
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public audience, and would not have related to his employment, the
court concluded his non-existent “intended speech” was a matter of
public concern.177
2. Applying Roe’s “work-relatedness” inquiry
Roe suggested, though not conclusively, that if speech is outside
work and is not work-related, an employee does not have to satisfy a
public concern inquiry and that even the Pickering balancing test
does not apply. Unfortunately, Roe undermined any extra
constitutional protection it may have offered off-duty, non-workrelated expression by defining “work-related” extraordinarily
broadly. Prior to Roe, courts generally adopted a common-sense
interpretation of when speech was work related, limiting it to speech
that referred to internal workplace disputes or the employee’s own
employment situation.178 In contrast, Roe suggested that workrelated expressive activities are not merely those that refer to the
subject matter of plaintiff’s government employment or to
supervisors and co-workers but also speech that undermines the
mission of the employer and reflects poorly on the employee’s fitness
for his profession. Not many courts have had the opportunity to
apply this expansive “work-relatedness” inquiry suggested in Roe,
but these few cases reveal some uncertainty about how to do it.
After Roe, the Ninth Circuit heard another case involving a
policeman who was punished when it was discovered he ran a
sexually explicit website. This case was arguably distinguishable from
Roe because Officer Dible’s website primarily featured his wife, and it
did not invoke his police work in any way.179 The court nevertheless
concluded that Dible’s involvement with the sexually explicit website
was work-related because ultimately the public did learn about his
connection with the website. The court also noted that “it can be
seriously asked whether a police officer can ever disassociate himself
from his powerful public position sufficiently to make his speech

177. Id. at 257–58. The circuit court also cited as apparently relevant the plaintiff’s
statements during a newspaper interview that he “didn’t do it as a Morgan County
Superintendent of Schools but as an individual and friend of the man who invited him.” Id. at
258.
178. See, e.g., Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112, 120 (Mass. 2000)
(noting that racially offensive joke employee told at retirement dinner was not work-related
because it did not involve internal office affairs or the employee’s employment status).
179. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2008).
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(and other activities) entirely unrelated to that position in the eyes of
the public and his superiors,” and his activities “had the same
practical effect” as Roe’s X-rated activities—they “‘brought the
mission of the employer and the professionalism of its officers into
serious disrepute.’” 180
The federal district court in Navab-Safavi v. Broadcasting Board
of Governors took a more restrictive view of the work-relatedness
inquiry in a case involving a Voice of America translator who
participated in a music video criticizing the United States’ invasion
of Iraq.181 The court held that the videos were unrelated to her
government work because she made the videos on her own time,
without using government resources, without mentioning VOA or
any of its activities or employees, and without mentioning that she
worked for VOA.182 Notably, although the Court in Roe found it
relevant that the plaintiff had used a generic police officer’s uniform
in his strip routines, the court in Navab-Safavi found that the music
video was not related to the translator’s work at VOA, even though
the challenged music video was superficially similar to a VOA
broadcast, set in a television studio featuring an anchorperson sitting
behind a desk and delivering news and commentary.183
Although Roe also suggests that an employee’s speech may be
work related if it undermines the mission and functions of the
employer, the district court ignored that expansive view of workrelatedness and instead cited NTEU, which held that expressive
activities are not work-related when they have at most “an indirect
nexus to her workplace by virtue of an ‘adverse impact on the
efficiency of the office in which plaintiff worked.’”184 The court
rejected the government’s argument that the employee’s
participation in the music videos “drew her objectivity into
question” because the argument was based on mere speculation,
given that there was no evidence that “plaintiff ever mistranslated
anything, that her translations were found to be biased, or that the
audience perceived such bias in her translations.”185 The court also

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
(1995)).
185.

Id. at 926 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 81 (2004)).
650 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 2009).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 59 n.7.
Id. at 57 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465
Id. at 58–59.
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rejected the contention that her activities “compromised VOA’s
journalistic integrity and credibility.”186 The court noted that no one
would have associated the videos with VOA because the plaintiff
“was not held out to the public as a representative of VOA, as she
never appeared on-air as a VOA worker, and her name was never
used on-air in association with her services.”187
3. Whether and how to apply Pickering’s balancing test
The lower courts have also reached different conclusions about
how and when to conduct the Pickering balancing test. Before
NTEU, some courts questioned whether the balancing test was
appropriate at all for expression outside of work. After that case, the
Court has suggested that the Pickering test does apply in such cases,
but it is hardly clear that it should.188 Even if a balancing test is
appropriate in such cases, questions remain about how to conduct it.
Courts struggle to determine the “value” of speech, especially when
it does not involve political speech, and how to evaluate the
government employer’s interests in restricting expression that is not
clearly about work.
a. Does the test apply at all? The first question is whether the
Pickering balancing test applies to all public employee expression
that takes place outside of work. The Pickering balancing test was
developed in a particular context to address the need to give
employees the opportunity to discuss public issues while protecting
the government employer’s right to run an efficient and effective
workplace. Pickering involved a public school teacher who wrote a
letter to the editor about the funding decisions of the school
board—her ultimate supervisor. Although Pickering’s complaints did
not directly involve his co-workers or immediate supervisors, his
editorial letter did relate in some way to his employment, even if
only tangentially. The Court established the balancing test to apply
in “the enormous variety” of fact situations that might arise when it
is important for an employer to have some power to discipline its
employees for their expressive activities.189 The Court mentioned

186.
187.
188.
189.

2152

Id. at 60.
Id. at 62.
See supra III.B.1.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968).
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several possibilities, such as situations where the employee criticizes
his direct supervisor or co-workers and undermines harmonious
working relationships with them;190 the employee has breached
confidences when loyalty and confidentiality are essential to the
job;191 or the employee’s speech impedes the proper performance of
his job duties or interferes with the general operation of the
employer.192
It is less obvious that the Court in Pickering meant that a
balancing test should apply even when the employee’s speech does
not have any obvious connection to his employment. True, Rankin
applied the balancing test to an employee’s non-work-related
comment about the Reagan assassination attempt, but the employee
made that comment at the workplace. It might make some sense to
give an employer greater authority to restrict speech at the workplace
because there is a greater chance that such speech will disrupt or
otherwise interfere with efficient government operations, but this
rationale is less persuasive when off-duty speech is at issue. Some
lower courts have recognized this possibility, but because the Court
applied Pickering in NTEU, a case that involved off-duty, non-workrelated speech activities, most courts simply apply Pickering because
they feel they have no choice.193 Bound by NTEU, the lower courts
have held that the location and work-relatedness of the expressive
activity at issue are more appropriately taken into account during the
balancing process itself.194
b. Applying the Pickering balancing test in off-duty/non-workrelated cases. In applying the Pickering balancing test, courts must
weigh the value of the employee’s speech against the government
employer’s interest in restricting that expression. Courts have
struggled to determine how to conduct the “value” inquiry as well as
what to consider cognizable government interests.

190. Id. at 569–70.
191. Id. at 570.
192. Id. at 572–73.
193. See, e.g., Navab-Safavi v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 650 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55–57
(D.D.C. 2009) (noting in case involving employee’s off-duty criticisms of United States
involvement in Iraq that “Pickering and its progeny primarily addressed government
employees’ criticisms of their immediate supervisors or coworkers,” but going on to apply the
balancing test in light of NTEU).
194. Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 175 (2d Cir. 2006); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336
F.3d 185, 194 (2d Cir. 2003).
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One issue dividing the lower courts is whether the “value” of the
employee’s speech should be taken into account in the Pickering
balancing test. Rather than decide at the outset through application
of Connick’s public concern inquiry that the speech is not valuable
enough to be entitled to any First Amendment protection, several
courts have used the Pickering balancing test to take into
consideration the value of the speech when balancing the employee’s
interest in making the expression against the government employer’s
interest in suppressing it, as Judge Posner suggested in Eberhardt.195
Thus, even employee speech that arguably involves a matter of public
concern can be given little weight in the Pickering balance if that
speech is not considered “serious” or “portentous.”
In Pereira v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts took the approach Judge Posner recommended when
it applied the Pickering balancing test to a racially offensive joke an
investigator for the Department of Social Services made while
attending a dinner honoring retiring public officials. Although the
parties stipulated that the employee had an “unblemished” record
throughout her twelve years of employment at DSS, she was fired
when the press inaccurately reported that she had made this joke
during her prepared remarks.196 The court rejected the
Commonwealth’s argument that the joke failed the public concern
test and instead considered the value of the joke as part of the
Pickering balancing test. The court concluded that the government
interests easily outweighed any interest the employee had in making
the joke.197 The court explained that the employee’s “motive was not
to engage in debate, raise awareness, or press a position.”198
Some courts have held that the employee’s motivation for
engaging in the expressive activity at issue is relevant. As one court
put it, “[t]he fundamental question is whether the employee is
seeking to vindicate personal interests or bring to light a matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community.”199 Thus,
speech that might otherwise relate to a matter of public concern
might fall out of that category if the speaker’s “intent” was not to
195. Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112, 120–21 (Mass. 2000);
Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994).
196. Pereira, 733 N.E.2d at 116.
197. Id. at 120–21.
198. Id. at 121.
199. Cahill v. O’Donnell, 75 F. Supp. 2d 264, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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reveal wrongdoing but instead just to do his job, or if his speech is
also somehow wrapped up with an interest in improving his
particular job situation.200 Courts have also focused on the audience
to whom the employee’s speech was directed. Focusing on the
audience to whom the employee communicates her dissatisfaction
puts the employee in a bind. If the employee limits her speech to the
workplace, courts are less likely to conclude that it involves a matter
of public concern. On the other hand, if she does communicate with
the outside world, she runs the risk of strengthening her employer’s
argument that the speech is unnecessarily disruptive to the
workplace.201
Lower courts disagree about whether off-duty speech that
involves a matter of public concern should be given more weight in
the Pickering balance. The Second Circuit has suggested it should,
holding that “[t]he more speech touches on matters of public
concern, the greater the level of disruption the government must
show.”202 Other courts have held that the Pickering test asks what
the plaintiff’s interest was in making the challenged expression, not
in the value of that expression.203 These courts have argued that offduty public employee speech is entitled to the same protection given
to comparable speech made by non-employees, which includes the
right to “free, uncensored artistic expression—even on matters
trivial, vulgar, or profane.”204
c. Weighing the government’s interest. In Rankin, the Court said
that relevant government interests include “whether the statement
impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a
detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal
loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of
the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of the
enterprise.”205 The Court has held that these harms need not have
actually occurred. Rather, lower courts typically follow the Court’s
direction to give deference to government employer determinations

200. For a discussion of this issue with case examples, see Ma, supra note 11, at 132–34.
201. See Massaro, supra note 11, at 23–24.
202. Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 197 (2d Cir. 2003).
203. Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1565 (10th Cir. 1989); Berger v. Battaglia,
779 F.2d 992, 999–1000 (4th Cir. 1985).
204. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1565; Berger, 779 F.2d at 1000.
205. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (5th Cir. 1987).
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concerning the harm of its employee’s speech and the risk of
disruption.206
Lower courts have also disagreed whether any actual or expected
external disruption resulting from an offended public can play a role
in the Pickering balancing. Some courts have held that only actual or
potential disruption of internal operations could outweigh an
employee’s right to engage in otherwise protected expressive
activities.207 These courts contend that relying on the public’s
reaction to an employee’s speech is equivalent to permitting a
“heckler’s veto,” which the Supreme Court has rejected as a
constitutional basis for restricting protected expression.208
Other courts have recognized that although allowing the
majority to silence an unpopular minority through a heckler’s veto is
unconstitutional, at times public reaction is a legitimate government
interest. For example, the Second Circuit has held that allowing the
government to cite parental outrage about a teacher’s membership in
NAMBLA did not constitute an impermissible heckler’s veto because
this reaction was more properly considered an internal disruption:
“Parents are not outsiders seeking to heckle Melzer into silence,
rather they are participants in public education, without whose
cooperation public education as a practical matter cannot
function.”209 Some courts have tried to dodge the heckler’s veto
issue by holding that the requisite disruption is shown not by the
public reaction itself, but rather the internal disruption caused in the
government workplace when it has to divert its resources to respond
to that adverse public reaction.210
Many courts have also rejected First Amendment claims by police
and fire employees who had engaged in hate speech off duty on the
grounds that the speech undermined the public trust. The Second

206. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994). But see United States v. Wilcox, 66
M.J. 442, 449–52 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (reversing conviction of member of military who attended
KKK rally and advocated and encouraged participation in extremist organizations online using
the identifier “US Army Paratrooper” because military had failed to show actual or potential
adverse impact on good order and discipline in the armed services or that his racist views
adversely affected his job performance).
207. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1566–67; Berger, 779 F.2d at 1000–01.
208. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1566–67; Berger, 779 F.2d at 1001.
209. Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 199 (2d Cir. 2003).
210. See, e.g., Easton v. Harsha, 505 F. Supp. 2d 948, 969–70 (D. Kan. 2007)
(recognizing actual disruption to the internal functioning of a police department caused by
having to respond to public criticism of employee’s blog posts).
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Circuit has explained that public racist speech poses a “reasonable
threat of disruption in the context of the jobs of police officers and
firefighters,”211 and that “[t]he First Amendment does not require a
Government employer to sit idly by while its employees insult those
they are hired to serve and protect.”212 In the context of the police
department, for example, courts contend that when their employees
engage in racist and other offensive speech off the job, “respect for
law enforcement is eroded and the ability of the police to do its work
in that community is impaired.”213 Similar rationale has been used in
cases involving other government officers that routinely interact with
the public, such as social service workers.214
When now-Justice Sotomayor was sitting on the Second Circuit,
she dissented in a case involving an employee of the New York City
Police Department who anonymously sent racist material in the mail
to various nonprofit organizations that had solicited him for
donations.215 The majority rejected the employee’s First Amendment
claims on the ground that his actions undermined the mission of the
NYPD and threatened to promote racial strife among the officers.216
The employee was a computer operator who did not hold a highlevel position, or have policy-making authority or contact with the
public.217 Sotomayor argued that it was essential to consider not just
the mission of the government agency at stake, but also the
relationship of the disciplined employee to that mission.218
Sotomayor argued that it was significant that “Pappas engaged in the

211. Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Karins v. City of Atl.
City, 706 A.2d 706, 715–16 (N.J. 1988) (rejecting First Amendment claim based on
firefighter’s racial slur to police officer; court noted that “bigotry in a fire department can
endanger lives,” and that racial tensions between firefighters and police officers were dangerous
because an “almost symbiotic relationship” exists between the police and fire departments).
212. Locurto, 447 F.3d at 183.
213. Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Easton, 505 F. Supp.
2d at 970–71.
214. See also Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112, 121–22 (Mass. 2000)
(upholding dismissal of investigator for Department of Social Services for making racially
offensive joke at a testimonial dinner because DSS was not required to take the risk that its
investigators would be regarded as biased and unfair, and at the very least, the joke illustrated
that the employee had poor judgment that is “inconsistent with the task often fraught with
difficulties that investigators face every day”).
215. Pappas, 290 F.3d at 154–59 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 147 (majority opinion).
217. Id. at 148; id at 158 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
218. Pappas, 290 F.3d at 156 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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speech anonymously, on his own time, and through mailings sent
from his home.”219 These factors are important, she explained, for
several reasons. First, because he did not identify himself as a
member of the police force, and because he was a low-level employee
with no public contact, no one would think his views represented the
NYPD—as they might if he were the Police Commissioner.220
Although Sotomayor recognized that the employee was eventually
unmasked and that the resulting bad publicity threatened to
undermine NYPD’s relationship with the community, she noted that
in this case the NYPD itself had unmasked its employee and created
the bad publicity by publicizing his activities.221 Because the
employee engaged in this admittedly offensive speech in private and
on his own time as a “private citizen,” Sotomayor concluded that the
222
Pickering balancing tilted strongly in his favor.
IV. SUGGESTED APPROACH
This Article argues that the Court should reconsider its approach
to the off-duty expressive activities of government employees,
particularly when they are not work-related. First, the Court should
abandon a threshold public concern requirement in such cases.
When an employee engages in speech outside of work on topics that
are not directly related to work, the government employer’s interest
in restricting that speech is low. The public concern inquiry
inappropriately gives employers almost complete control over their
employees’ private discourse. Because this suggested approach turns
on whether speech is in fact work-related, a more robust discussion
of the definition of “work-related” is essential. This Article argues
that expressive activities should be considered work-related only
when they criticize the workplace where the employee works,
including criticism of her co-workers or supervisors.
This Article also argues that the Court should also reconsider the
application of the Pickering test in cases involving off-duty, nonwork-related expressive activities. Rather than subjecting this speech
to the vagaries of a balancing test, the Court should conclude that
such speech is presumptively entitled to strong First Amendment

219.
220.
221.
222.
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Id. at 157.
Id. at 157–58.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 158.
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protection that can be overcome only in two limited circumstances.
The first is when the government can demonstrate that the
employee’s expressive activities reveal that the employee is unfit to
perform his duties. The second, informed by the government speech
doctrine, is when the employee holds such a significant leadership
position within the organization that it is reasonable for the public to
associate the views of that employee with the agency, and the speech
actually disrupts or threatens to disrupt the proper functioning of the
agency.
A. Abandon the Public Concern Requirement in Cases Involving NonWork-Related Expressive Activities
The Court should abandon the public concern inquiry in offduty cases involving expressive activities that are not directly related
to the employee’s work. As Justice O’Connor argued in her
concurring opinion in NTEU, Connick’s “public concern” inquiry
has no place as applied to “off-hour speech bearing no nexus to
Government employment-speech that by definition does not relate
to ‘internal office affairs’ or the employee’s status as an employee.”223
1. Narrow definition of “work-related”
The first step is for the Court to narrow its definition of what it
means for speech to be work-related. The definition of “workrelated” is important because it serves as a threshold inquiry to the
two tracks of constitutional analysis the Court has suggested for offduty expression. If speech is not “work-related,” then a public
employer faces a much higher burden to overcome its employee’s
First Amendment rights. If the speech is work-related, in contrast,
the employee can succeed only if he can survive the
Pickering/Connick framework, a daunting task.
The Court has been inconsistent about what it means for
expressive activities to be work-related. In Pickering, a school teacher
criticized his school district’s school board in a letter to the editor, in
which he did not conceal his identity. The subject matter of his
expression directly concerned his workplace writ large—the school
system—but not his immediate supervisors, co-workers, or job
duties. Nevertheless, the Court declared that his expression was
223. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 480 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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“only tangentially and insubstantially” related to his public
employment.224
In contrast, in Roe, the Court held that the fact that a police
officer indirectly referred to his employment in the context of selling
sexually explicit videos was sufficient to make his expression workrelated. In that case, the officer’s speech did not concern his
supervisors, his co-workers, or the subject matter of his work. There
was no indication that consumers of Roe’s sexually explicit tapes
knew his identity; he did not wear his uniform in the videos, nor did
he identify himself in those videos as an officer. Following this
expansive view of “work related,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that
another officer’s sexually explicit website was also “work related”
even though he had done nothing to tie the website to his
employment, noting that “it can be seriously asked whether a police
officer can ever disassociate himself from his powerful public position
sufficiently to make his speech (and other activities) entirely
unrelated to that position in the eyes of the public and his
superiors.”225
Interpreting “work related” in the broad manner Roe suggests
threatens to swallow all of the expressive activities of public
employees, at least as soon as the public at large learns the identity of
the speaker, and places employees in perpetual danger of losing their
jobs for anything they say, even outside of the workplace. The Court
should back away from a broad definition of work related that
encompasses any speech that refers to the employee’s status as a
government employee. Instead, the Court should return to a
common-sense notion of “work-related” that restricts that category
to speech that itself directly refers to the employee’s workplace,
supervisors, or co-workers. Any concerns about how the speech may
reflect on the employee’s ability to do his job or how the speech may
interfere with the work of the government employer can be taken
into account in other ways. Under this approach, the speech at issue
in Pickering—a teacher’s criticism of the school board’s funding
decisions—would represent the outer edge of what constitutes workrelated expression.

224. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
225. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2008).
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2. Abandon public concern requirement in non-work-related cases
In Connick, the Court made it clear that its imposition of a
public concern requirement was an attempt to carve out a small but
important subset of work-related expression from First Amendment
protection as a way of reducing litigation. In that case, the
employee’s speech concerned specific details about her workplace;
there could be no doubt that her expression was work related, and
the Court established a public concern test because it was particularly
concerned about opening up the floodgates to First Amendment
litigation involving work-related speech. While it may have been
appropriate for the Court to establish this sort of threshold
requirement for work-related expression—although there are good
reasons to believe that even in that context the test is misplaced—it is
clear that this threshold inquiry question is not appropriate for cases
involving expression that does not directly involve work.226
As discussed in Section III.A, there are many fundamental
problems with a public concern inquiry in any context. In addition
to the lack of clear guidance from the Court regarding how this
inquiry should be conducted, perhaps the greatest problem is the
“squishiness” of the inquiry that permits courts to make explicit ad
hoc value judgments about expression.227 Applying the public
concern inquiry in off-duty cases has been particularly difficult.
Courts have especially struggled to figure out how to conduct a
public concern inquiry in cases involving expressive associations and
in cases involving hate speech. For example, in Pappas v. Giuliani, all
three judges sitting on the Second Circuit panel had different views
about whether hate speech sent anonymously in the mail constituted
a matter of public concern. One judge dodged the issue, another
said it was clearly not a matter of public concern, and still a third
(then-Judge Sotomayor) said that it was just as obvious that it was a
matter of public concern.228 In the case of Andrew Shirvell, anti-gay

226. Some lower courts have noted this problem. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d
1557, 1563–64 (10th Cir. 1989); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1985).
227. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 164 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
against public concern standard, noting that in the defamation context the Court had rejected
that approach in favor of focusing on the status of the plaintiff) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974))).
228. This same issue has been raised in Synder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010), where the Court must determine whether hate speech
directed at a particular individual involves a matter of public concern entitled to greater First
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comments may, to some, seem to fall outside of the category of
public concern, but given that they were made in the context of
criticizing an elected student leader, they are arguably a matter of
public concern.
Similarly, it is not obvious whether the type of sexually explicit
material at issue in Dible and Roe is a matter of public concern. As
distasteful as the expression might be, it clearly does have some
expressive value, and it was disseminated to a public audience. Just as
the Supreme Court has held—in other contexts—that artistic and
entertaining speech is entitled to full First Amendment protection
even if it lacks a political message, protection for the cop’s strip tease
in Roe should not turn on whether he can convince a court that he
was using this form of expression to make some sort of political
comment on sexuality and power in our society.
Even if we could establish a workable definition of what
constitutes a matter of public concern, it still would not make sense
to place the rights of government employees to engage in private
expression at the whim of their government employers. When
considering the employee’s interests at stake, it is necessary to
consider not merely his interest in contributing to the public debate,
or even society’s interest in hearing what he has to say, but also in his
interest in autonomy and freedom from governmental interference in
matters pertaining to his personal life.229 The Court’s decision in
Lawrence v. Texas underscores the need to give protection to public
employee speech on private matters. As Paul Seconda has pointed
out, “Lawrence attaches some form of heightened review when the
government seeks to interfere with the private and personal lives of
individuals.”230
The public concern requirement is overbroad because it operates
to strip First Amendment protection from speech that does not
necessarily interfere in any way with the operation and management
of the government agency.231 This problem appears particularly likely

Amendment protection. The Court heard oral argument in this case in October 2010; a
decision is expected by June 2011.
229. Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The
Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private
Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 123 (2006).
230. Id. at 117.
231. For a more thorough discussion of the vagueness and overbreadth concerns Connick
created, see Rosenthal, supra note 146, at 557–67.
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when the speech at issue does not directly involve the workplace. A
public concern requirement therefore is not appropriately tied to the
underlying theory of why we would permit a government employer
to restrict the speech of its employees, especially when that speech is
not directly related to the workplace.232
Although the focus of this Article is on off-duty expression, the
Court should abandon a public concern inquiry for all non-workrelated expression, whether it takes place at work or off-duty. Public
employees have private conversations at work on both public and
private issues, and the government’s interest in preventing or
punishing these sorts of conversations typically has very little to do
with the subject matter of the comment and more to do with
whether the comment interferes with the employee’s work.
Employees spend too much of their lives at work to be expected to
limit all their expression at work to work-related topics, and as the
facts of Rankin illustrate, in many cases the employer has little
legitimate reason to restrict most of what its employees say at work
that is not directly work related.
One reason to address the applicability of a public concern
requirement to all non-work-related expression is that any legal
regime that turned on whether the employee was on- or off-duty
could be difficult to apply in some cases. In the age of the Internet
and other electronic technologies, it is more common than ever
before for employees to engage in non-work-related expression while
they are technically on the job. Indeed, Andrew Shirvell was
ultimately terminated in part because his employer discovered that he
was using his work computer to blog and his work telephone to call
Nancy Pelosi’s office, where the student leader was interning, to
insist that the student be fired. As people spend a greater proportion
of their waking hours at work, the opportunity for self-expression
outside of the workplace diminishes. Furthermore, as greater
numbers of employees telecommute from home, the line between
workplace and home diminishes. With the pervasive use of electronic
technology, like cell phones and the Internet, employees often
perform work-related functions while they are not at work. As the
next subsection will discuss, in many cases government employers
will still be able to defeat their employee’s First Amendment claims
without having to rely on a threshold public concern test.

232. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573–74 (1968).
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The ambition of this Article is modest, and as a result it does not
take a position on whether the public concern inquiry should be
abandoned in all employee speech cases. Given all the difficulties
inherent in a public concern inquiry, and the ability of the Pickering
balancing test to account for the value of the employee’s speech, that
might be a good idea, and many commentators have made that very
suggestion. Regardless of the merits of that broader argument,
however, the need to abandon a public concern test in non-workrelated, off-duty cases is especially compelling. When speech is not
work related, Connick’s concern about constitutionalizing all
employee grievances is not present. Furthermore, in that context
there is no good reason to accept as a general rule that the
government employer’s interests always trump its employee’s interest
in engaging in off-duty, non-work-related expression unless it is a
matter of public concern.
B. Presumptive Protection for Off-Duty, Non-Work-Related Expressive
Activities and Limited Government Defenses
Courts should not apply the Pickering balancing test to evaluate
the First Amendment rights of public employees to engage in offduty, non-work-related expressive activities. Such a test is inherently
subjective, lacks uniformity, and as a practical matter, offers little
protection to government employees. Instead, assuming that the
employee’s speech does not fall within a category of unprotected
expression, off-duty, non-work-related speech should be
presumptively protected and can lose this protection only if the
government employer can show one of two things. The first is that
the speech reveals that the employee is unfit to perform his duties.
The second is that the employee holds a leadership position within
the organization that makes it reasonable for the public to conclude
that the employee’s views represent those of the government. The
latter exception would apply in a very narrow group of cases.
1. Reject Pickering test in favor of presumption
When evaluating whether the expressive activities of a
government employee are entitled to First Amendment protection,
courts should not apply the Pickering balancing test. Instead, courts
should presume that such speech activities are protected, provided
they do not fall into a category of unprotected expression, and
permit the government employer to overcome this presumption only
2164
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in those limited circumstances when the government’s interest so
warrants.
The biggest problem with applying the Pickering balancing test
to the off-duty, non-work-related expressive activities of government
employees is that it offers too little protection to that speech. Often
these cases involve speech that lies at the fringes of the First
Amendment, such as hate speech and sexually explicit expression, or
speech that is otherwise regarded as offensive. As a result, courts all
too often conclude that the employee’s expression has such limited
value that it is easily outweighed by whatever interests the employer
asserts. In conducting the balancing, courts do not consider how
government control of its employees’ off-duty expressive activities
can have broader societal impact by resulting in a significant chilling
effect on the speech of a huge number of citizens and on the
marketplace of ideas generally.233 Indeed, the Pickering balancing
test is designed to focus more narrowly on the facts of the particular
case.
Another problem with the Pickering balancing test as most
courts have applied it is that it permits adverse public reaction to the
expressive activities to be considered on the government’s side of the
balance. As a result, it theoretically matters very little what an
employee says. If there is a public reaction, then the employee will
likely lose constitutional protection for his speech. If the public never
learns about the employee’s speech, or for whatever reason does not
react strongly to the employee’s speech, then the employee has a
stronger chance of winning his case.234 Relatedly, given that the
Pickering balancing test gives substantial deference to the
government employer’s predictions of disruption, there is a great
chance in any given case that an employee is punished not because
his speech actually caused or threatened disruption, but, as Justice
Marshall noted in Rankin, “simply because superiors disagree with
the content” of the expression.235
Rejecting the Pickering balancing test in favor of presumptive
protection for the off-duty, non-work-related expressive activities of
government employees recognizes the inherent difficulties of
233. For an excellent discussion of the serious problems inherent in balancing tests, see
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
234. For a lengthier discussion of this problem, see Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing
Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1021 (2005).
235. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).

2165

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/21/2011 12:39 PM

2010

applying a balancing test to such speech. This is not a presumption
that is insurmountable, but it serves simply to give an employee’s
expressive activities a fighting chance against government
suppression.
2. Overcoming the presumption
Although this Article contends that the off-duty, non-workrelated expressive activities of government employees should be
given robust First Amendment protection, it recognizes that it is
essential to give government employers the ability to overcome this
protection in appropriate circumstances. Government employers
should be permitted to overcome the presumptive protection for its
employees’ speech activities when it can demonstrate either that (1)
the speech demonstrates that the employee is unfit to perform his
work duties, or (2) the public reasonably believes that the
government employee speaks for the government enterprise, and the
message of that employee undermines the proper functioning of that
agency.
a. Unfit to perform work duties. Although an employee’s off-duty,
non-work-related speech should be entitled to a strong presumption
of constitutional protection, the government employer must be
given the authority to suppress or punish that speech when the
speech reveals that the employee is unfit to perform his job duties.
By focusing on the employee’s ability to perform his job, this
approach avoids the dangerous and easily abused inquiry into
whether the speech is inconsistent with the overall mission of the
government enterprise.
This approach requires the government to demonstrate that the
employee cannot perform his own job, not that his speech
undermines the mission of the government agency as a whole. This
defense would necessarily be very fact- and context-specific. The
position and responsibilities of the employee would be of paramount
importance in determining whether the expressive activities indicate
unfitness. Jobs that require the exercise of discretion or public trust
demand a higher standard of conduct from those who hold them.
Thus, it is unlikely that the NYPD could demonstrate that racial bias
rendered the computer operator in Pappas unfit to do his job given
that there was no showing that he interacted with the public in any
way or that his job required the exercise of discretion. The majority
2166
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in that case emphasized that at any moment Pappas could become a
beat officer; however, the officer was not in fact a beat officer when
he was terminated, and under the approach this Article proposes,
there is no reason why the NYPD should not be able to take his offduty expressive activities into account before promoting him to such
a position. In addition, this defense would not be of much help in
cases involving sexually explicit speech, such as that of the cops in
Roe and Dible. Vague assertions that the officers’ sexually explicit
activities undermined the “professionalism” of the office would be
insufficient; instead, their employers would have to demonstrate that
the activities undermined their ability to do their jobs. It is hard to
see how such activities would have that effect.
Notably, the government’s ability to succeed on this defense
would have nothing to do with the public’s reaction to the
employee’s expressive activities, thus avoiding the risk of a heckler’s
veto.236 Thus, it would not matter that the parents in Meltzer were
up in arms and threatened to withdraw their children from school. It
should not be up to the community to determine whether the
employee is fit to perform his job; otherwise, First Amendment
freedoms would hang by a very slender thread. It is not hard to
imagine parents getting upset if a teacher created sexually explicit
videos like those at issue in Roe, but assuming the teacher did not
share them with his students, it is not clear that such conduct reveals
unfitness for teaching. Instead, under the unfitness standard this
Article proposes, the school district would have to demonstrate that
a teacher’s association with NAMBLA renders him unfit to teach
high school students. Although in that case there was no evidence
that the teacher had ever abused his students or other minors, the
school would have a strong argument that his active membership in
an organization that advocates for such relationships indicates
unfitness for a position where it is essential that he can be trusted
with minors.
An unfitness defense might also come into play in cases involving
non-work-related expression that happens at work. When an
employee engages in non-work-related expression while performing
his job duties at work, the government employer should generally be
given more power to restrict that speech on the grounds that the

236. It would also avoid the risk that a public employee’s speech rights would depend on
whether the public learns about his expressive activities.
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employee is unable to do his job effectively. For example, if the clerk
at the Department of Motor Vehicles has a proclivity for lecturing
customers about his view of political affairs, the employer should be
given more leeway to restrict that expressive activity, even though it
relates to a matter of obvious public concern.
In evaluating a government employer’s assurance that its
employee’s off-duty speech indicates unfitness for office, courts
should take care to take into account the precise form, content, and
context of the speech. Random or isolated comments made privately
should rarely be sufficient to indicate unfitness. For example, it is not
clear that an isolated off-color joke like that at issue in Pereira would
be sufficient to demonstrate that a social worker is unfit to perform
her job, any more than the off-handed remark about the Reagan
assassination attempt in Rankin indicated that the employee was illsuited for law enforcement work. If an employee has been working
for the government agency for some time, the government should be
required to present evidence that the alleged character trait has
revealed itself in the employee’s work.237 The government should not
serve as the political-correctness police and punish their employees
any time the employees engage in expressive activities that are
outside of the mainstream. As one judge has argued, if courts are
quick to accept the unfitness defense, “[t]he State, in short, with
impunity, could not only chill, but control, the speech of a
significant number of citizens, who work for State government,
simply because they work for State government.”238
It is not clear that the unfitness defense would help the Michigan
Attorney General’s office justify its termination of Andrew Shirvell.
In his initial comments defending his decision to keep Shirvell on the
job, Attorney General Cox emphasized that Shirvell was just a lowlevel, line attorney who worked on appellate matters. It is not clear
what sort of discretion was involved in his daily activities or what sort
of contact he had with the public, if any. Without knowing more
about Shirvell’s job responsibilities, it is difficult to know whether his
anti-homosexual views would impede his ability to do his job. The
Michigan Attorney General’s office should be required to show
237. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 602 A.2d 712, 721 (Md.
1992) (Bell, J., dissenting) (arguing that a prison guard’s First Amendment rights were
violated when he was terminated for offensive remarks he made to a bank teller while
attempting to cash a check off-duty).
238. Id. at 727.
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specifically how his bias has played out or threatens to play out in the
kinds of cases that he handles.
The point of my argument is that courts should not immediately
accept the government’s vague assertion that its employee’s offensive
or unpopular speech reveals unfitness for his job duties without a
more searching analysis that considers both the content of the
expression and the precise duties of the employee. Membership in
NAMBLA probably does not indicate unfitness to be a prosecutor
(unless the prosecutor is responsible for litigating child abuse cases)
but does indicate unfitness to be a school teacher. Participation in
explicit sexual videos does not indicate unfitness to serve as a police
officer (unless those videos contain violence), but may indicate
unfitness to serve on a government commission against pornography.
This sort of fact-specific inquiry protects the government’s legitimate
interests in performing its functions efficiently and effectively without
sacrificing the expressive rights of its employees unnecessarily.
Notably, General Cox does not appear to be resting his decision
to terminate Shirvell solely on concerns that his anti-gay attacks
indicated that he could not perform his job, but rather the ground
that he misused his work computer and telephone to engage in these
attacks.239 Although government employers, like private employers,
should have the right to control the use of their own equipment,
relying on this defense to defeat Shirvell’s First Amendment claim is
problematic. Employees frequently use their work telephones and
emails for personal use while they are on break. Although Shirvell
may technically have used state resources to wage his attack, it is not
clear from publicly available information whether Shirvell used his
work email account or invoked his position as an assistant attorney
general to engage in his criticisms of the student body president.240
Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect that public employees will
spend every moment they are at work engaged in work-related
activities. At the very least, courts should pause before concluding
that government employers have absolute power to discipline their
239. See David Jesse, Andrew Shirvell fired from job at Michigan Attorney General's
Office, ANNARBOR.COM (Nov. 8, 2010, 2:46 PM) http://www.annarbor.com/news/andrewshirvell-fired-from-job-at-attorney-generals-office/. In announcing Shirvell’s termination,
General Cox stated that although he still believes employees have First Amendment rights,
Shirvell was terminated for misusing state resources, engaging in borderline stalking behavior,
and for lying to investigators during his disciplinary hearing. Id.
240. If he had, the Attorney General’s Office would have a much stronger argument that
Shirvell had misused his authority and misrepresented the views of the AG’s office.
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employees whenever they use government equipment for non-workrelated speech.241
b. Interference with government speech. A second possible defense
in cases involving a public employee’s off-duty, non-work-related
expression involves a permutation of the government speech doctrine
the Court invoked in Garcetti. When it is reasonable for the public
to associate the expressive activities of a government employee with
his employer, and that speech is inconsistent with the clearly
articulated mission of the employer, the employee’s First
Amendment rights must yield. This defense draws loosely upon the
government speech doctrine.
It is difficult to apply the government speech doctrine in a
straightforward manner in cases involving non-work-related
expressive activities. Whereas in Garcetti the majority suggested that
the government speech doctrine had traction in cases involving any
speech an employee might make pursuant to his job duties, it is
impossible to justify restrictions on off-duty, non-work-related
expression on the grounds that it is speech that the government has
bought and paid for.
That does not mean, however, that the government speech
doctrine is not relevant in off-duty, non-work-related cases. The
Court has suggested in some of its freedom of association cases that
it is important to require a group to accept a member whose
viewpoints are at odds with those of the organization as a whole
because it would essentially force the group to engage in compelled
speech. Thus, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Supreme Court
held that forcing the Boy Scouts of America to admit a gay
scoutmaster in order to comply with a state anti-discrimination law
“would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message,
both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts
accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”242
The Court majority relied heavily on its prior decision in Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, which held that the
241. The Supreme Court recently noted the difficulties of resolving cases involving
government-issued electronic devices. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30
(2010) (in a case involving an employee’s communications on government-issued pager, the
Court declined to issue a “broad holding concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis
employer-provided technological equipment” citing concerns that technology and community
and workplace norms were constantly changing).
242. 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
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First Amendment protected the right of the organizers of a private
St. Patrick’s Day Parade to exclude an Irish-American gay, lesbian,
and bi-sexual group that wanted to march behind their own
banner.243 In Hurley, a unanimous Court concluded that requiring
the private group to admit the GLIB group would interfere with a
speaker’s “autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”244
The Court held that including the GLIB group in the parade,
marching behind their own banner, would send the message that
people of their sexual orientation have as much of a right to
unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals, and the private group
had every right to keep that message out of their own parade.245
There are several problems with extending the rationale of Dale
and Hurley to the context of government employment, not the least
of which is that a government agency is not an expressive
organization.246 But even putting that major obstacle to one side, the
sheer number of government employees would make it unreasonable
for a citizen to assume that the off-duty speech of any one of them
represents the views of the employer. As Justice Stevens noted in his
Dale dissent with respect to the Boy Scouts, which has admitted over
87 million young Americans into its ranks during its existence: “The
notion that an organization of that size and enormous prestige
implicitly endorses the views that each of those adults may express in
a non-Scouting context is simply mind boggling.”247 The same must
certainly be true, if not more so, for governmental agencies that are
bound by the First Amendment. Just as a reasonable person should
not view all speech in the public square as expressing a governmentendorsed message, neither is all off-duty speech of a government
employee.
While it might not make sense to permit a government employer
to claim that all of its employees’ off-duty expressive activities reflect
on the government agency in some way, there may be some cases
where it might be reasonable for the public to associate an

243. 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995).
244. Id. at 573.
245. Id. at 574–75.
246. For an excellent criticism of the assumption that government employers are
expressive associations with First Amendment rights to disassociate itself from any message it
deems antithetical, see Paul M. Secunda, The Solomon Amendment, Expressive Associations, and
Public Employment, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1767 (2007).
247. 530 U.S. at 697 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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employee’s off-duty expressive activities with his employer. In a
separate dissenting opinion in Dale, Justice Souter argued that “[i]t
is certainly possible for an individual to become so identified with a
position as to epitomize it publicly,” particularly if that person is in a
leadership position.248
It might also be reasonable for the public to associate the offduty speech of a government employee with the government agency
that employs him in cases where the employee uses his government
position to communicate his message. In a footnote in Rankin, the
Court made clear that it did not mean to suggest that low-level
employees were immune from discharge on account of their
expressive activities. The Court cited approvingly a case from a
federal appellate court that upheld the discharge of a clerical
employee who stated on television news that he was an employee of
the sheriff’s office and a member of the KKK.249 Similarly, a
reasonable person might think that an employee is speaking as an
employee if he uses his work email account or office letterhead to
communicate.250 It is not reasonable, however, to assume an
employee speaks for his government agency whenever his private
communications are made public. If an employee engages in
anonymous speech, as in Pappas, it is not reasonable for the public to
associate that employee’s speech with his employer even when he is
unmasked. Similarly, in Roe, the fact that the stripping officer used a
generic police uniform in his videos is not a sufficient basis for a
reasonable person to connect Roe’s activities with the San Diego
Police Department.
Even if the government can show that the public reasonably
associates the employee’s speech with his employer, the government
must also demonstrate that the speech is inconsistent with a clearly
(and previously) articulated message that is essential to its mission.
Because government enterprises are not expressive associations, there
is no reason to defer to their assertions of what viewpoints are
essential to their mission, as the Court did with the Boy Scouts in

248. Id. at 702 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained he voted to reject the
BSA’s claim because it had failed “to make sexual orientation the subject of any unequivocal
advocacy, using the channels it customarily employs to state its message.” Id. at 701.
249. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 391 n.18 (1987) (citing McMullen v. Carson,
754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985)).
250. This is not the same as simply using a work computer or other electronic device to
communicate. One does not have to use a work email account to send an email from work.
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Dale. Requiring that the government agency clearly articulate before
litigation what viewpoints are essential to its mission both provides
notice to the employees of what speech will not be tolerated and also
limits the ability of the government to discipline employees for
speech it simply does not like. Thus, in Roe, even if a reasonable
person could connect the stripping officer to the San Diego Police
Department, it is unclear how his activities were inconsistent with
the mission of that agency.
In considering whether the speech of public employees interferes
with the ability of their government employers to communicate a
particular message, it is also important for courts to consider the
ability of the government employer to engage in effective
counterspeech.251 Such counterspeech can serve to distance the
government employer from its employee’s speech. Indeed, Pickering
itself found it relevant that the school board could easily use
counterspeech measures to rebut any inaccuracy in Pickering’s
budget figures.252 The statement issued by Michigan Attorney
General Mike Cox early on in the Shirvell scandal is this sort of
counterspeech that reminds the public that government employees
retain their First Amendment rights to say what they please when
they are not at work, and that his views did not represent the views
of the Michigan Attorney General’s office. Of course, counterspeech
may not always be effective in cases where it is not possible for the
public to “disassociate” the employee’s speech from his government
employer. Typically this will occur in cases involving high level,
supervisory employees.
The government speech defense may, in some cases, give
government employers greater authority to restrict the speech of
their employees while they are at work. After all, there is a much
greater likelihood that the expression of a government employee at
work will be reasonably regarded as representing the views of the
government, particularly when it is made to the public in the course
of performing work-related duties. Thus, when a government
employee speaks to a customer at a government office, a customer
might reasonably believe that the employee represents the views of
the government because the employee is serving as the “public face”

251. Smith, supra note 11, at 273.
252. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
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of the government agency. In addition, government counterspeech is
likely to be ineffective in such circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
The aim of this Article is not to suggest that the Court must
entirely revamp its jurisprudence regarding public employee
expressive rights, although that would probably not be a bad idea.
Instead, it has an admittedly myopic focus on First Amendment
claims brought by public employees who have been disciplined as a
result of their non-work-related expressive activities that take place
outside of the workplace.
It is tempting to give government employers wide berth to
restrict the expressive activities of their employees given that most of
the cases involve highly offensive speech. It is worth noting,
however, that granting government employers this authority would
authorize the punishment of employee speech simply because
contrary to the views of the supervising government official. For
example, lower courts have seen cases involve anti-gay speech as well
as pro-gay rights speech. In addition, if employees do not have
robust protection for their off-duty speech, it is hard to see how they
would be entitled to robust protection for their private off-duty
conduct. Thus, an employer could fire an employee for any conduct
that the government employee believes is contrary to the
government’s mission, including intimate (and constitutionality
protected) decisions regarding sexuality, marriage, cohabitation, and
abortion. Permitting public employees to invoke the First
Amendment to protect speech that we abhor also permits others to
invoke it to protect speech that we think is worth protecting.
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